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S.K. LAU, perhaps the most perceptive academic observer of the 
Hong Kong social scene, has contended in his influential book1 
that the dominant cultural code in the territory is 'utilitarianistic 
familism'. This manifests itself in a normative and behavioural 
tendency of local Chinese to place their familial interests above 
the interests of other individuals, groups, and society as a whole, 
and to structure their relationships with other parties in a manner 
consistent with the ultimate objective of maximizing familial wel-
fare. The utilitarianistic dimension of familism is rooted, accord-
ing to Lau, in the strong inclination exhibited by family members 
to accord far greater importance to material interests than to 
non-material ones. 
Utilitarianistic familism is said to generate attitudes such as 
'aloofness towards society' ('[t]he Hong Kong Chinese in general 
neither identify with Hong Kong nor are committed to it but 
rather tend to treat it as an instrument. Consequently, society is 
conceived as a setting wherein one exploits . . . the opportunities 
available . . . to advance the interests of oneself and one's fami-
lial group');2 'avoidance of involvement with outsiders' ('[s]uspi-
cious attitudes towards outsiders and distrust of them have long 
been a recognized cultural feature of Chinese people, which have 
their roots in a peasant society where relatively self-contained life 
confined to small geographical areas was the rule. Given the 
Chinese abhorrence of conflict and aggression, we find the 
coexistence of intense emotional attachment among people in 
small groups, and cold impersonal postures towards those who 
are outsiders . . . In Hong Kong this avoidance attitude towards 
others has produced a relatively "cold" society in which concern 
with the well-being of others is low');3 'low social participation' 
('an aloof attitude towards society and the distrust of outsiders, 
together with the emphasis on familial groups, are followed by a 
low rate of participation in voluntary associations');4 'limited 
demands on government' ('[t]he primary role of government in 
society is largely conceived to be that of maintaining social stabil-
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ity, and it is understandable as Hong Kong has been haven [sic] 
for Chinese immigrants who fled from war and hunger in the 
mainland in the past one and a half centuries . . . As long as the 
government can maintain social stability it will be accepted, and 
the level of political frustration among Chinese will be held 
within controllable limits . . . service delivery is [increasingly] 
emphasized by the younger generations. Even in this aspect, 
however, the expectation is still rather low, and is far from the 
types of "aspiration explosions" plaguing other parts of the 
world');5 'political powerlessness' ('[u]nder the general rubric of 
diffuse tolerance of the existing form of government, it is also 
possible to locate a pervasive sense of political powerlessness 
among the Hong Kong Chinese');6 'deference towards 
government officials' ('[t]he attitudes of the Hong Kong Chinese 
towards . . . government officials are ones of envy, fear, respect, 
abhorrence, avoidance and aversion');7 and 'low political 
participation' ('political participation is usually shied away from 
by . . . ordinary people, and the middle-income residents are not 
much better in this respect').8 
The web of socio-political attitudes underpinned by utilitar-
ianistic familism is hardly likely to result in the active expression 
of collective opinion and its articulation in the form of public 
protest. For this reason, the twin issues of freedom of association 
and assembly historically have not loomed large on the local 
political agenda. The cultural influences which have prevented 
them from gaining greater prominence have been reinforced by 
the government's policy of emphasizing stability rather than par-
ticipation, as well as the rapid economic growth enjoyed by the 
territory in the 1960s and 1970s. The latter factor has helped to 
foster satisfaction with the system and has encouraged the diver-
sion of energy towards material pursuits. 
In recent years, however, Hong Kong people have displayed 
an increasing willingness to vent their grievances in public, and lend 
support to community-wide objectives. The question of the fu-
ture of Hong Kong after 1997 and the decision to build a nuclear 
power-plant at Daya Bay9 have served as principal catalysts in 
this respect, as has the growing sense of political efficacy in the 
face of the perceptible decline in government power. Confronted 
with the choice between exercising the option of 'voice' or disen-
gaging by availing themselves of the opportunity to 'exit'10 most 
of the territory's residents would perhaps prefer to 'vote with 
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their feet', but there appears to be a widespread realization that 
certain strategic questions call for political mobilization and that 
the pre-1997 period offers considerable scope for seeking political 
influence through organized means. This is a consequence of the 
weakening position of the colonial authorities and China's desire 
to be seen as benevolent in order to win local confidence during 
the transition years. Slower economic growth is also likely to 
intensify collective action by inducing social stress and heighten-
ing the sense of relative deprivation. 
In the light of these developments, it is reasonable to assume 
that the issues of freedom of association and assembly will attract 
greater attention in the future. Indeed, one of the aims of the 
present chapter is to speculate about likely government responses 
to the changing socio-political circumstances and to suggest 
possible legislative reforms. One cannot, however, proceed to 
deal with future contingencies without a discussion of past and 
present trends — particularly in Hong Kong where policy tends 
to evolve incrementally over a long period of time. Therefore 
observations about the future are preceded by a brief historical 
survey and a detailed analysis of the existing law. 
A . H I S T O R I C A L B A C K G R O U N D 
The history of legislation concerning the freedom of individuals 
in the territory to form and join associations is essentially one of 
continuing restraint. The first substantial encroachment on the 
freedom of association in Hong Kong after the Second World 
War came into effect in 1949 in the form of the Societies Ordi-
nance which imposed a duty of registration with the Registrar of 
Societies (the Commissioner of Police) on any association of 
people 'whatever its nature or object',11 and provided for exten-
sive governmental supervision. Subsequent amendments of the 
principal ordinance alternated between seeking a 'greater 
measure of control'12 and 'stricter control'13 over the activities of 
societies and their office-bearers by means of an expanded scope 
of application, extension of the Registrar's approval and regula-
tory powers, an increase in the range and stiffness of penalties, 
and a more effective system of law enforcement (achieved 
through the granting of protection to informers and through 
flexible rules of evidence). 
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The desire to maximize control over group activities has been 
fuelled by strong and legitimate concerns about the threat posed 
by pervasive triad influences in the territory.14 The preoccupation 
with the triad problem, however, has led local law-makers to 
overlook the many distinctions between different associations. 
Specifically, they have not addressed themselves over the years to 
the needs of groups not involved in crime and subversion. Such 
groups have thus continued to be constrained in their pursuit of 
objectives consistent with mainstream community values. 
Perhaps the most significant turning-point in the history of 
legislation pertaining to the freedom of assembly in Hong Kong 
was the year 1967, in which there was an attempt to 'consolidate 
and amend the law relating to the maintenance of public order, 
the control of organizations, meetings, places, vessels and air-
craft, unlawful assemblies and riots and matters incidental there-
to or connected therewith'.15 The same year was also marked by 
the worst civil unrest that Hong *Kong has experienced and, 
consequently, the Public Order Bill 1967 encountered little 
opposition, passing swiftly and with only a few minor amend-
ments. It is particularly noteworthy that no fundamental objec-
tions were raised in view of the strong emphasis placed by the 
Bill's presenters on 'prevention and control of disorder' while 
avoiding any reference to the right of members of the public to 
dissent or express their opinions by means of peaceful assembly. 
The Bill was projected as a measure erring on the side of safety 
and justified as a necessary response to the turmoil experienced 
in the preceding months.16 
In an effort to deflect potential criticisms, the government 
signalled that if the 'balance between citizen and state' changed 
or the implementation of the Bill disclosed 'gaps or provisions 
which proved unfair or oppressive', it would be 'ready and willing 
to consider suitable amendment'.17 Such an opportunity pre-
sented itself in 1970 with the enactment of the Public Order 
(Amendment) Ordinance, following the 'recognition that some of 
the provisions of the Ordinance confer unnecessarily wide powers 
in ordinary times and that, in a few instances, there may be a risk 
that innocent persons may become involved in offences'.18 The 
'need for [further] review of the provisions of the Public Order 
Ordinance [specifically]19 relating to public meetings and proces-
sions in the light of [new] circumstances' was acknowledged again 
nine years later.20 
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As indicated, the main purpose of the architects of the 1967 
Ordinance was that of 'strengthening the law dealing with public 
order'. To this end, they conferred wide powers on the relevant 
executive organs. Thus, the Commissioner of Police was granted 
the authority to prohibit the holding or continuance of any public 
gathering in any particular area or premises or on any particular 
day if he considers it necessary or expedient in the interests of 
public order to do so (section 15); the Governor in Council was 
provided with the power to ban all public gatherings for up to 
three months if he considers it necessary to do so in order to 
prevent serious public disorder (section 16); a police officer of or 
above the rank of inspector was authorized to prevent the hold-
ing of, stop or disperse, or vary the place or route of any public 
meeting, public procession, or public gathering other than meet-
ings exclusively for religious purposes (section 3); authority was 
also extended to such an officer to enter and search premises 
without warrant, search persons found in premises and stop and 
search vessels and vehicles in which such an officer knows or has 
reason to suspect that there is evidence of an offence under the 
ordinance (section 49); all police officers of any rank were given 
the power to prevent the holding of, and to stop or disperse an 
unlicensed public meeting or public procession (section 11); and 
their coercive ability was further buttressed by an array of 
ancillary powers such as the authority to issue orders and use 
necessary force (section 11); finally, section 50(1) accorded 
members of the Hong Kong Auxiliary Police Force on duty 
greater powers and immunities than they had previously held, 
placing them on a par with police officers of equivalent ranks. 
Nor was it just a matter of enhancing the control potential of 
law enforcement officers. The Public Order Ordinance 1967 also 
substantially expanded the scope of relevant offences to replace 
what had been regarded as the 'technical and ill adapted' and 
generally 'inadequate' common law on the subject of unlawful 
assembly and riot.21 To be more explicit, according to the Ordi-
nance (section 18), if three or more persons assembled together 
conducted themselves in a manner intended or likely to cause 
anybody reasonably to fear a breach of the peace, regardless of 
whether they shared a 'common purpose', they would constitute 
an 'unlawful assembly'. The latter, in turn, would amount to a 
riot as soon as any party present committed a breach of the peace 
(section 19). Furthermore, an unlawful assembly might be 
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deemed an 'intimidating' one under the new provisions (sections 
27-30) which introduced into the permanent law the substance of 
the Emergency (Prevention of Intimidation) Regulations 1967. 
As the impact of the 1967 disturbances started to dissipate, 
criticism intensified against powers granted to the police that 
were deemed to be 'unnecessary' or 'unjustifiable', and the likeli-
hood of 'morally innocent persons'22 falling within the broad 
terms in which some sections in the Public Order Ordinance were 
expressed. While admitting no actual abuse of the powers con-
ferred by the Ordinance or the unreasonable prosecution or 
wrong conviction of persons, the government proceeded to 'clarify 
some provisions about which doubt has been expressed and to 
relax others in order to give better protection to the public 
against any misuse of powers or against the possible conviction of 
persons innocently involved in circumstances which constitute 
offences under the Ordinance'.23 
Specifically, the term 'meeting' was redefined to include any 
meetings in which a degree of organization is exhibited, whether 
before or during the meeting, thus excluding a casual gathering of 
persons in a public place, hitherto regarded as a meeting subject 
to the requirement of a licence. Also excluded were meetings for 
any statutory purpose such as creditors' meetings or sittings of 
courts. Exempted additionally24 from the need to obtain a licence 
were meetings held for social or business purposes in licensed 
restaurants and funeral meetings. Amendments were introduced 
not only to narrow the ambit of the Ordinance's application but 
also to restrict the exercise by police officers of the power to 
prevent the holding, stopping, and dispersing of public meetings 
(section 11), as well as the powers to prohibit the public display 
of flags and banners (section 3) to occasions where these could be 
believed to be reasonably necessary (rather than on the basis of 
the officer's opinion). Similarly curtailed were the wide powers of 
search and entry granted to police officers under the 1967 Ordi-
nance (section 49); they retained merely the qualified authority to 
require a person to identify himself if this was considered neces-
sary for the purpose of preventing or detecting a crime. 
Perhaps even more significant was the attempt to circumscribe 
the liabilities and offences under the Ordinance. In such a vein, 
the strict obligation imposed on the licensee to be present from 
the first assembly of the meeting to its final dispersal was 
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amended to enable him the defence of absence by reason of 
illness or other unavoidable cause. By the same token, a person 
responsible for the organization, promotion, direction, or man-
agement of a meeting which was prohibited by the Commissioner 
of Police under section 15 would, under the new provisions, be 
guilty of an offence only after the issue of the prohibition order. 
The defence of 'lawful authority or reasonable excuse' was also 
guaranteed by the 1970 amendment to 'participants' (as distinct 
from organizers) charged with taking part in an unlicensed assem-
bly (section 12) who could demonstrate that they had been inno-
cent bystanders and had become involved unintentionally. The 
plea of lawful authority or reasonable excuse was extended in like 
manner to persons charged with having an offensive weapon in 
their possession at a public meeting or procession (section 14), in 
the light of the wide definition of 'offensive weapon' which in-
cludes articles that are in common use (such as choppers or 
knives). Of particular importance were the amendments of the 
offences of unlawful assembly (section 18) and riot (section 19), 
requiring a disorderly, intimidating, insulting, or provocative 
element in the conduct of an assembly before it became unlawful. 
As a result of these amendments, the offence of 'intimidating 
assembly' became superfluous since a person taking part in an 
intimidating assembly could be prosecuted for taking part in an 
unlawful one. 
The 1970 attempt to strike a better balance between the values 
of public authority and individual liberty notwithstanding, the 
implementation of the provisions in the Public Order Ordinance 
imposing constraints on freedom of assembly continued to pro-
voke criticism, the most grave of which entailed allegations of the 
arbitrary exercise of police power and selective enforcement of 
the law.25 A series of events in 197926 and particularly an impor-
tant Supreme Court judgment27 served to highlight the anomalies 
in the existing legislation and apparently prompted the govern-
ment to convene a working party (in May 1979) with a view to 
recommending possible improvements in the law relating to the 
licensing and control of public meetings and processions.28 The 
working party's efforts culminated in the Public Order (Amend-
ment) Ordinance 1980 which sought primarily to replace the 
established licensing procedures pertaining to public meetings 
with a simplified system of police notification in the context of 
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substantially redefined 'meetings' and 'processions', thus arguably 
paving the way for a variety of public meetings to be held without 
official permission. 
The shift towards a less sweeping form of monitoring public 
meetings was justified by the government on the ground that 
there was a 'sufficiently stable' Hong Kong with a 'sufficiently 
responsible' population.29 Be that as it may, the further liber-
alization of the law undertaken in 1980 was still heavily in-
fluenced by considerations of public order and security. The then 
Attorney General shed light on the cautious attitude displayed by 
the authorities more than a decade after the eruption of the 1967 
disturbances by portraying the territory as a potentially volatile 
place. As he put it, 
although Hong Kong today is stable, and its population, with very few 
exceptions, responsible it was not always so, and — who knows — in the 
future issues unforeseen by us today may arise which could lead to the 
expression of strongly opposing views supported perhaps by different 
groups or different factions in society. And it is to be remembered too 
that in all societies and in all places it happens sometimes that those who 
hold strong and controversial views may, through misguided enthusiasm 
or indeed sometimes perhaps through malice, attempt to insist upon the 
expression of their views in places and at times when to do so may risk 
or even be actually designed to cause unrest.30 
Given the lingering fear that the communication of opinions in 
the public domain poses the danger of escalating into political 
conflict and destabilizing the precarious social order, the import-
ance of the 'right to demonstrate' as an integral part of the 
freedom of expression was — again — not accorded full recogni-
tion by local law-makers in 1980. In this respect, the latter have 
not departed from the British tradition which denies a positive 
legal principle supporting the right to demonstrate and gives 
greater weight to the imperatives of political order.31 However, 
eve* in jurisdictions in which no such denial prevails, some form 
of regulation of public meetings and processions is considered 
legitimate. The specific regulatory measures adopted by the Hong 
Kong government are therefore of interest, despite the intellec-
tual rejection of the right to demonstrate in principle. These 
measures, as well as those pertaining to the formation of and 
membership in associations and the law which incorporates them 
are described and evaluated in the following section. 
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B. S U R V E Y O F E X I S T I N G L E G A L P R O V I S I O N S 
The local authorities have opted to regulate the freedom of 
association and assembly in the territory by a variety of means 
ranging from 'prior restraint', through 'subsequent punishment' 
to 'dispersal powers'. The first type of measure includes registra-
tion as a form of 'pre-association' control and three 'pre-assembly' 
methods of vetting made available under the Public Order Ordi-
nance, namely licensing, notification, and banning orders.32 
1. Regulation by Prior Restraint 
a. Registration 
As pointed out earlier, any organized group is required under the 
Societies Ordinance to apply to the Registrar of Societies for 
registration. Exemption from registration may be granted by the 
Registrar to societies established solely for religious, charitable, 
social, or recreational purposes, but all groups formed for other 
purposes must be approved and registered by him.33 Indeed, 
approval and registration may be denied for a variety of reasons, 
including the mere fact that the 'society is a branch or affiliated 
or connected with any organization or groups of a political nature 
established outside the Colony' or the arguably vague suspicion 
that it is 'likely to be used for any purpose prejudicial to and 
incompatible with peace, welfare or good order in the Colony' 
(section 6). The Registrar's decision may none the less be re-
versed, or modified, should the parties affected succeed in their 
appeal to the Governor in Council in accordance with section 12 
of the Ordinance. In the absence of registration or exemption, a 
local society is deemed to be an unlawful entity (section 18) and 
its office-bearers, any person managing it or assisting in its man-
agement, and any member who attends its meetings are subject 
to severe penalties (section 19). 
b. Licensing 
The licensing procedure is detailed in section 13 of the Public 
Order Ordinance which stipulates that public processions consist-
ing of more than 20 people and taking place on public highways, 
public thoroughfares, or public parks must be authorized by a 
licence issued in writing by the Commissioner of Police. The 
licence — once given — is subject to conditions relating to the 
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forming, conduct, route, times of passing, and dispersal of the 
procession as the Commissioner of Police may impose, as well as 
a general condition that the licensee be 'present at the public 
procession from the first assembly thereof to the final dispersal 
thereof in order to ensure the 'due performance and compliance 
with the conditions of the licence and the maintenance of public 
order throughout the period of assembly, conduct, and dispersal 
of the public procession' (section 15). Furthermore, the Commis-
sioner of Police enjoys wide discretionary power to grant or 
withhold the necessary permit and is guided merely by the elastic 
formula that he be 'satisfied that the public procession is not 
likely to prejudice the maintenance of public order or to be used 
for any unlawful purpose'. The Commissioner may thus refuse a 
licence to hold a public procession, unless for the sole purpose of 
a funeral, and is constrained in this respect only to the extent 
that: 
The applicant or any person or society associated directly or indirectly 
with the application or likely in the opinion of the Commissioner of 
Police to be concerned with the organizing, convening, forming or con-
duct of the public procession has, in relation to any public gathering, at 
any time contravened the provisions of [the Public Order Ordinance] or 
any other law or any other condition of a licence, issued under [the] 
Ordinance or any other law; or that 'the public procession has been 
advertised or otherwise publicized prior to the determination of the 
application' (section 13 (6)). 
A right of appeal to the Governor is none the less granted (under 
section 16) to an aggrieved person whose application for a licence 
is rejected or whose licence is cancelled or amended. On the 
other hand, a procession to which the licensing requirement 
applies, and which is held without a licence or in breach of its 
terms, is deemed to be an 'unauthorized assembly' and the organ-
izers and participants alike are guilty of an offence (section 17A). 
c. Notification 
The notification requirement applies under the present system to 
public meetings which involve — or are expected to involve — 
more than 30 people in a public place or more than 200 people in 
private premises, excluding, however, meetings held in schools or 
accredited educational establishments with the consent of the 
management (section 7). Failure to give such notification renders 
the meeting 'unauthorized' and carries with it criminal liability 
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and a heavy penalty (section 17A). By contrast, meetings 
preceded by a notification in accordance with the prescribed 
procedure — that is, seven working days in advance and provid-
ing the Commissioner of Police with full details — may take 
place, although subject to strict conditions (section 11). The 
freedom to hold public meetings is further circumscribed by the 
extensive powers granted to the Commissioner of Police to pro-
hibit intended meetings notice of which has been given (section 
9), though section 16 provides for a right of appeal to the Gov-
ernor to rescind the prohibition order. 
d. Banning Orders 
The Hong Kong authorities have at their disposal banning powers 
both of a general and a specific nature. Thus, a general ban on 
all, or a class, of public gatherings in the territory for a period not 
exceeding three months may be imposed by the Governor in 
Council 'if he is satisfied that by reason of particular circum-
stances existing in Hong Kong or in any part thereof, it is necessary 
for the prevention of serious public disorder' (section 17E). In 
addition, the Commissioner of Police is empowered to place a 
specific ban on public gatherings 'if it appears to him to be 
necessary or expedient in the interests of public order so to do' 
and regardless of whether the gathering is disorderly or violent 
(section 17D). 
2. Subsequent Punishment 
Tight control over associations and public assemblies may also be 
exercised in the territory through provisions regulating the con-
duct of members and participants. A local society (registered or 
exempted) which is regarded as being 'used for purposes prejudi-
cial to or incompatible with peace, welfare or good order in the 
Colony' may thus be dissolved by the Governor in Council (sec-
tion 30, Societies Ordinance). The Public Order Ordinance also 
contains restrictive provisions which impinge on the freedom of 
people in Hong Kong to organize themselves for the purpose of 
collectively expressing their views. Specifically, it authorizes 
police officers of or above the rank of inspector to prohibit the 
display of flags, banners or other emblems at public gatherings, 
private premises or on various transport vehicles (and use the 
necessary coercive means to enforce these prohibitions) on the 
basis of their reasonable belief that such display is likely to cause 
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or lead to a breach of the peace (section 3). Similar prohibitions 
are extended to the wearing of uniforms signifying one's affilia-
tion with any political organization or the promotion of political 
objects (unless permitted by the Commissioner of Police) (section 
4). Finally, section 5 makes it an offence to organize, train or 
equip the members of an association whose purpose is to usurp 
force in promoting any political object. 
With respect to public assemblies, the principal legal tool of 
controlling conduct is section 18 of the Public Order Ordinance 
which defines the offence of 'unlawful assembly' as the assembly 
together of three or more persons who conduct themselves in 
a 'disorderly, insulting or provocative manner intended or likely 
to cause any person reasonably to fear that the persons so assem-
bled will commit a breach of the peace, or will by such conduct 
provoke other persons to commit a breach of the peace'. More 
disruptive forms of assembly are dealt with by invoking the 
offence of 'riot' (section 19) which may be described as an unlaw-
ful assembly turned violent. Also subject to prosecution under 
the Ordinance (section 26) is a person who 'without law-
ful authority, at any public gathering makes any statement or 
behaves in a manner which is intended or which he knows or 
ought to know is likely to incite or induce any person' to engage 
in acts of violence. More specific restrictions are imposed in the 
Public Order (Public Meetings) (General Conditions) Order 1981 
with regard to the duty to maintain good order at a public 
meeting; the requirement to notify the date, location, and dura-
tion of the meeting; the use of amplification devices; the display 
of banners; advertising arrangements; the burning of national 
emblems; the collection of money; stage performance; the re-
moval of litter at the conclusion of meetings; and the dispersal of 
crowds. 
Another cluster of offences which reinforces the punishment 
system directed at restraining public gatherings concerns picket-
ing. Thus, while it is 'lawful for one or more persons, acting 
on their behalf or on behalf of a registered trade union or of 
an individual employer or firm, in contemplation or further-
ance of a trade dispute, to attend at or near a place where a per-
son works or carries on business, if they so attend merely for the 
purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating informa-
tion or of peacefully persuading any person to work or abstain 
from working', it is an offence to 'so attend in such numbers, 
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or otherwise in such manner, as to be calculated to intimid-
ate any person in that place or to obstruct the approach there-
to or egress therefrom or to lead to a breach of the peace' 
(section 46, Trade Unions Ordinance).34 Indeed, such a gathering 
would under the same ordinance be tantamount to 'watching and 
besetting' of that place, conduct which constitutes the offence of 
'intimidation and annoyance' (section 47). 
The array of punitive measures that may be employed by the 
Hong Kong authorities to enjoin public assemblies is further 
buttressed by statutes proscribing public nuisances,35 obstruction 
of public places,36 incitement to disaffection,37 criminal damage 
to property,38 or obstruction of police officers in the execution of 
their duty,39 and supplemented by common law offences40 and 
statutory instruments.41 
3. Dispersal Powers 
Considerable dispersal powers have been conferred upon police 
officers (in the case of both lawful and unlawful gatherings) if 
they reasonably believe that such activities are 'likely to cause or 
lead to a breach of the peace' (section 17, Public Order Ordi-
nance). In addition, to facilitate the enforcement of dispersal 
orders, police officers may use such force 'as may reasonably be 
necessary', to enter any premises in which persons are gathered 
or close specific places to the public (section 17). Failure to 
comply with dispersal orders is a criminal offence which is 
severely penalized (section 17A). 
C. E V A L U A T I O N 
There is a dearth of judicial pronouncements on the subject of 
freedom of association and assembly in Hong Kong. Thus an 
assessment of the extent to which this freedom is preserved must 
inevitably focus primarily on statutory provisions and government 
policy reflected in them. The criteria of evaluation, however, 
mirror international norms and legal practice in other jurisdic-
tions. Equipped with such external yardsticks, but not without 
regard to local conditions, one may endeavour to ascertain the 
appropriateness and justiciability of the limits imposed on the 
exercise of the freedom of association and assembly in the terri-
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tory, and particularly whether it exists only in so far as the 
regulating authorities allow it to exist. 
At the outset, reference should be made to international 
guarantees of the freedom of association and assembly which are 
applicable in Hong Kong. Of special relevance here are Article 
20 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,42 stating 
that '[e]veryone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly 
and association', and Articles 21 and 22 of the 1966 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,43 which stipulate (respec-
tively) that '[t]he right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized' 
and that '[ejveryone shall have the right to freedom of association 
with others'. These rights, however, are not absolute and it is 
acknowledged that restrictions may be imposed which are 'neces-
sary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or 
public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public 
health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others'.44 The key issue, therefore, is the proper balance between 
competing rights, interests, and values, or, more specifically, to 
reconcile the inherent conflict45 between the freedom of indi-
viduals to organize themselves in groups, attend public meetings, 
or participate in public processions on the one hand, and societal 
needs for peace and order, on the other. 
Achieving such a balance often eludes governmental decision-
makers for they tend to gravitate towards the public security and 
public order end of the value spectrum, thereby stifling individual 
freedom. Indeed, as the preceding survey of the law in the 
territory suggests, the Hong Kong bureaucracy has displayed a 
disquieting proclivity to seek to minimize environmental disturb-
ances at the possible cost of impeding individual expression. 
While the authorities pay lip service to the ideal of striking a 'fair 
balance' between these competing rights, the right to a stable 
environment46 invariably carries greater weight. 
Whether a fair balance is struck depends in the first instance on 
the mechanism adopted for the regulation of associations and 
public gatherings. It is possible to argue, for example, that prior 
restraint of any kind dilutes to a certain extent the freedom of 
association and assembly. On the other hand, some form of prior 
restraint may be necessary to hold organized crime at bay, ensure 
proper control of traffic and allow optimal deployment of traffic 
control resources. Early notice may also be necessary whenever 
complex decisions concerning priorities between competing pub-
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lie uses are faced.47 The key issue, therefore, is not the justi-
ciability of prior restraint as such but the appropriateness of the 
specific method employed for this purpose. 
As outlined previously, the procedures devised by the Hong 
Kong government encompass a wide range of prior restraint 
measures, some aspects of which appear acceptable, or even 
essential, but which tend on the whole to restrict excessively 
freedom of association and assembly in the territory. To begin 
with, the requirement that all associations, irrespective of their 
nature and objectives, be registered, is neither reasonable nor 
necessary. Clearly, the burden is on government to identify the 
type of associations which should meet this requirement as a 
matter of public interest without unduly circumscribing the legiti-
mate rights of other groups. What renders the requirement of 
registration particularly objectionable is the branding as an 'un-
lawful society' of any association which does not comply with it, 
including ones whose intentions are not malicious and whose 
activities cause no social harm. The consequent penalties, when 
directed against groups which pose no threat to the social order, 
violate principles of retributive justice given the lack of pro-
portionality between harm caused and punishment inflicted. 
Perhaps an even more conspicuous restraining technique ap-
plied locally is the licensing of public processions. While pos-
sibly facilitating more efficient traffic planning, and reassuring 
'risk averters' who may prefer to have prior knowledge of the 
areas within which they can operate without exposing themselves 
to the risk of committing traffic or similar offences, the licensing 
system inhibits the freedom of expression and discourages those 
who may be seeking public channels to exercise their voice option 
and are willing to risk the consequences. 
Generally, the 'costs' associated with mandatory licensing 
schemes of the type relied upon in Hong Kong are thought to 
outweigh the benefits. Thus, from a theoretical standpoint, sub-
jecting the right to peaceful assembly to the requirement of a 
licence substantially devalues that right and reduces it to a limited 
privilege granted at the discretion of the authorities. More tan-
gible costs are those identified by Baker in his recent study.48 They 
include a cost in the form of what amounts to a proscription of 
valuable means of expressive conduct such as 'spontaneous' 
demonstrations.49 Another concrete cost imposed by licensing 
systems manifests itself in the notion of being 'licensed to demon-
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strate' which implies state paternalism or what Baker refers to as 
'compelled symbolic affirmation of allegiance'. Strong exception 
is taken particularly to the fact that 'government requires the 
permit in order to do what one already has a right to do'50 and 
that licensing 'forces . . . dissidents to acknowledge, by requiring 
them to act out, the authority and dominance of the very govern-
ment against which they protest'.51 An even more significant cost 
attributed to licensing procedures is their vulnerability to arbi-
trary or biased decision-making on the part of the officials 
involved. According to one writer, 'common experience is suf-
ficient to show that [licensers'] attitudes, drives, emotions and 
impulses all tend to carry them to excesses'.52 Baker adds that 
licensing methods are often used to harass and suppress dissi-
dents and other advocates of minority opinions unacceptable to 
the authorities or the mainstream community.53 The institutional 
dynamics in which licensing is embedded also tend to encourage 
officials to circumscribe the rights of unpopular groups. ('Saying 
"yes" creates more trouble, more work, potential problems, and 
accompanying criticisms.'54) 
It could be argued that the record of the police shows a pro-
pensity towards granting approval to applications for licences.55 Be 
that as it may, the relatively small number of applications may in 
itself be indicative of the repressive nature of licensing, and the 
existing scheme remains open to potential abuses. Such abuses 
cannot be ruled out since the present system lacks built-in safe-
guards against violations of civil liberties.56 
The lack of safeguards is not the only questionable feature of 
the licensing procedures. Equally problematic is the provision 
under which a procession held without a licence or in breach of 
its terms is deemed an 'unauthorized assembly' rendering any 
participant guilty of an offence. Given that the law requires those 
who desire to hold, organize, and convene a procession to apply 
for a permit, fairness dictates that the sanction for non-
compliance be directed against such people alone. 
Similar objections may be raised in relation to another form of 
'prior restraint' currently applied in Hong Kong with respect to 
public meetings, namely notification. Like licensing, it also has 
the undesirable effect of placing the onus on the person wishing 
to exercise his right to assemble and does not allow for the 
possibility of semi-organized or spontaneous protest. In addition, 
the far-reaching decision to make a failure to notify the Com-
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missioner of Police of the intention to hold a public meeting a 
criminal offence subject to a heavy penalty is hardly compatible 
with liberal notions of freedom of assembly and association; nor 
is there any tangible evidence to suggest that it is conducive to 
the promotion of the objectives normally served by criminal law. 
As Fisse and Jones have contended, 'demonstrations of highly 
radical persuasion are unlikely to be influenced, and may even 
favour the creation of new targets of disobedience'.^ 
Furthermore, while an argument could possibly be put forward 
in support of some form of notification, under specific conditions, 
with regard to 'moving assemblies' or processions,58 no such 
argument may legitimately be offered where the problem of 
allocating scarce resources to competing uses does not arise and 
the mass movement of people does not take place (that is, where 
no police supervision is required). The instrumental value of no-
tification is also dubious, for the police tend to learn about most 
public gatherings through informal channels such as their own 
intelligence network and prior publicity, which calls into question 
the practical need for imposing a statutory objection to notify the 
authorities unless the purpose is to cause 'embarrassment to law 
abiding citizens'.59 
Equally questionable are banning orders whose statutory 
rationale is not grounded in actual disorderly or violent be-
haviour, but in the subjective belief of the Commissioner of 
Police that it is 'necessary or expedient in the interests of public 
order'. Although broadly similar banning orders exist in other 
jurisdictions — for example, some European countries have 
adopted banning procedures in conjunction with a notification 
requirement for the purpose of restraining unruly processions — 
they generally do not apply to gatherings other than processions, 
are reserved for circumstances involving serious public disorder 
which the authorities are ill-equipped to contain, and are drafted 
with a view to minimizing abuses.60 Even the banning powers 
granted under British legislation, which have attracted consider-
able criticism, are confined to processions and are contingent on 
the inability of the police to prevent serious public disorder by 
means of control mechanisms that enable the attachment of spec-
ific conditions as to time, area, and route.61 
While the British system is marginally superior to the local one 
in so far as banning is concerned, it constitutes an inadequate 
model in that its 'blanket' nature has apparently inspired Hong 
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Kong law-makers to confer upon the Governor in Council the 
authority to impose general bans on public gatherings in the 
territory. The lack of discrimination between peaceful and violent 
assemblies is particularly disturbing in this respect because the 
powers at issue extend to public gatherings of any type, strength-
en unduly the capacity of the Governor in Council to exercise 
political control, and leave limited scope for judicial review. 
In addition to the problems stemming from reliance on 
mechanisms such as registration, licensing, notification, and ban-
ning orders, the local system for regulating associations and pub-
lic gatherings exhibits deficiencies that may be attributed to the 
fact that the standards which feature in the relevant provisions 
are very elastic and place too much discretion in the hands of the 
decision-making body. As indicated, incompatibility with the 
'peace, welfare or good order in the Colony' is deemed to be a 
legitimate ground for the denial of registration by the Registrar 
of Societies. Similarly, the 'maintenance' of public order or the 
'interests of public order' may justify refusal by the Commission-
er of Police to permit the holding of public meetings or to grant a 
licence for a procession and can provide him with sufficient 
grounds to prohibit any public gathering. No attempt is made to 
delineate or carefully define the conditions under which such 
restrictions on the freedom of assembly and association may be 
imposed. In consequence, the standards in question are open to 
abuse and arbitrary application, and clearly fail to meet the 
criteria built, for instance, into the 'overbreadth' doctrine em-
braced by American courts.62 
Another problematic factor which enters into local regulatory 
decisions concerning freedom of association and assembly per-
tains to the past behaviour of potential organizers. Thus, the 
Registrar of Societies may refuse to register a society if any of its 
office-bearers has been convicted of an offence under any other 
ordinance which in the Registrar's opinion renders him unfit to 
hold office in that society (section 6, Societies Ordinance). Simi-
larly, a conviction of a person or a collective body associated with 
the organization of a public meeting for an offence under the 
Public Order Ordinance allows the Commissioner of Police to 
proscribe the holding of such a meeting. An even greater power 
is given to the Commissioner in the exercise of his discretion in 
the context of public processions, authorizing him to deny a 
licence to applicants who at any time violated provisions of any 
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law or permit relating to public gatherings. The unfairness in-
herent in depriving persons of the freedom to assemble and voice 
their views publicly in an organized manner on account of the 
prior conviction of the leaders of the planned society or event has 
been emphasized by several writers.63 Their criticism is rooted in 
the assumption that the past conduct of organizers is merely one 
of several variables which impinge on the outcome, peaceful or 
otherwise, of group activity and that it is not a particularly reli-
able predictor in this respect. They also express misgivings about 
the denial of civil liberties to persons who have already suffered 
punishment for their unlawful conduct. 
The employment of ill-defined and dubious standards is not 
confined to 'pre-association' and 'pre-gathering' measures alone, 
but also extends to the regulation of existing societies and gather-
ings 'in progress'. Considerable ambiguity, for instance, charac-
terizes the standard of 'peace, welfare or good order in the Colony' 
and yet activities inconsistent with it may prompt a dissolution of 
an existing society by the Governor in Council. Equally unsatis-
factory is the 'breach of the peace' criterion which guides de-
cisions regarding the public display of objects such as flags in 
gatherings, police powers to stop and disperse, and the offences 
of disorder in a public place, unlawful assembly, and riot. No 
definition of the concept of 'breach of the peace' is provided in 
any ordinances, nor is it in fact possible to find a 'modern and 
authoritative definition' in English and Commonwealth jurispru-
dence.64 Moreover, '[t]he quest for an all-embracing definition 
might, perhaps, be an illusory one.' For 'what amounts 
to a breach of the peace sufficient to justify or require a police-
man's prophylactic intervention in one context (rowdiness on the 
streets after a party) might be of a different order from the 
threats to the peace that can be tolerated in the course of a picket 
or demonstration.'65 The multi-dimensional nature of the concept 
of 'breach of the peace' has been highlighted by Bevan,66 who 
has attributed to it at least five different shades of meaning, each 
with different ramifications in so far as the freedom of association 
and assembly is concerned. To illustrate, if the notion of 'breach 
of the peace' is interpreted to encompass any public disturbance, 
police officers in Hong Kong may be permitted to prevent public 
gatherings merely on the ground that would-be speakers might 
express views likely to offend some listeners or that their noisy 
behaviour could disrupt the tranquillity of the neighbourhood. In 
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contrast, limiting the term to an 'actual outburst of violence' may 
be regarded as too restrictive in the face of a serious and immi-
nent threat of violence. 
Indeed, the absence of an unequivocal definition of 'breach of 
the peace' leaves unregulated a most crucial facet of the freedom 
of assembly, namely the question of a 'hostile' audience or, more 
specifically, whether one's liberty should be restricted because of 
the intolerance and unlawful behaviour of one's audience. The 
Public Order Ordinance in its present form offers no distinctions 
with respect to the source of disturbance, particularly such as 
between the persons assembled and other parties reacting to their 
conduct. As a corollary, it fails to give recognition to the fun-
damental democratic principle that under normal circumstances67 
the right to assemble freely should never be revoked or control-
led because of threatened violence by unreceptive spectators.68 
It is also undesirable to make criminal liability for offences 
such as unlawful assembly and" riot largely dependent on an 
ambiguous concept like 'breach of the peace' and the mere likeli-
hood that some people might be stirred into hostile reaction. As 
Bevan contended, the key element in ascribing criminal liability 
in the context of freedom of expression must be intention on the 
part of the speaker to incite violence or recklessness. The law 
should 'only punish the speaker who intentionally or recklessly 
sets out to provoke violence whilst acquitting the speaker whose 
opponents are the real source of disorder'.69 At the same time, 
the use of 'fighting words' which 'by their very utterance inflict 
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace'70 may 
engage the speaker in criminal activity subject to punishment. 
The existing legal provisions in the territory with regard to dis-
order in public places and unlawful assembly, although incorpor-
ating some reference to intention, omit the critical elements of 
imminence and seriousness of the anticipated violence, placing 
excessive discretionary power in the hands of the police and 
injecting ambiguity into a domain which is in need of certainty. 
The problem is compounded by the fact that the objects of 
regulation themselves, namely societies, meetings, and proces-
sions, are not carefully defined. Consequently, borderline cases 
may proliferate, further detracting from the value of the law as 
a mechanism for reducing uncertainty. It is not clear, for instance, 
whether an informal group whose members share the sole com-
mon objective of enjoying a game of bridge or mahjong consti-
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tutes a society for the purpose of the Societies Ordinance.71 By 
the same token, one is at a loss to decide which issues qualify as 
'matters of interest or concern to the general public or a section 
thereof in relation to public meetings.72 Finally, the loose ex-
pression 'common purpose' which furnishes the basis for the 
definition of procession73 can hardly be said to promote clarity. 
The deficiencies of the present legislation do not manifest 
themselves in the prevalence of ambiguous phrases alone. 
Another factor is the appropriateness of the vesting of public 
officials with such an extensive authority to make crucial de-
cisions concerning the freedom of association and assembly. As 
Lord Scarman noted, '[a]t the end of the day standards of police 
conduct and the proper use by the police of their powers mean 
more to society than the theoretical state of the law'.74 In his 
view, the answer lies in better organization, accountability, train-
ing, and supervision of the police,75 but the question still remains 
as to whether police officers should exercise such wide-ranging 
controls over the freedom of association and assembly in Hong 
Kong. It is, for instance, legitimate to query whether police 
officers whose principal function is the maintenance of peace and 
order are likely to be sufficiently sensitive to the importance of 
citizens' rights to peaceful association and assembly. Further-
more, there is a danger that the Commissioner of Police, given 
his prominent position within the executive branch of govern-
ment, may be subject to improper political influences in discharg-
ing his responsibilities as the official controlling societies and 
public gatherings. 
The great latitude enjoyed by police officers with respect to 
these two forms of group activity is of particular concern to civil 
libertarians in the territory in view of the fact that no neutral, 
non-political, independent reviewing body is assigned to check 
police discretion. The Hong Kong legislation does provide for 
appeals against rejections of applications for registration as a 
society, against refusals to allow public meetings, and against 
denials of licences to hold public processions. None the less, the 
appeals are to another administrative authority which, although 
theoretically capable of a more strategic grasp of social problems, 
is not free from executive bias. As in the United Kingdom, the 
legislation does not provide for appeal to the courts and a test 
case brought before the European Commission on Human Rights 
lends support to the conclusion that no such remedy is 
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available. Yet, as Brownlie observed, there is no reason why 
courts could not review the exercise of the powers at issue on the 
basis of the 'ordinary principles of administrative law'. Be that as 
it may, in the absence of clearly and narrowly defined criteria, 
and given the subjectively phrased legislation, an effective chal-
lenge to the wide discretionary powers granted to the relevant 
authorities is not a realistic prospect. 
D . S U G G E S T I O N S F O R R E F O R M A N D F U T U R E 
P R O S P E C T S 
Whether the freedom of association and assembly in the territory 
is actually abused by the law enforcers because of legislative 
loopholes cannot be established with certainty,78 yet reliance on 
the good faith and self-restraint of officials hardly provides a solid 
foundation for the protection of civil liberties. There are also 
grounds for the concern that — since societies, public meetings, 
and proceedings are at most 'lawful' within the existing legal 
framework — the freedom to associate and assemble may be 
entirely abrogated if brought into conflict with a competing right 
or obligation. It is desirable, therefore, to 'carve out [for such a 
freedom] a protected status'79 or at least elevate it above 'the 
interstices of the substantive law'80 which it occupies in the Hong 
Kong legal system. This would allow it to play a greater and more 
definite role in legislative, executive, and judicial decision-
making.8' 
The importance of the right of association and assembly cannot 
be overemphasized. Indeed, as Macfarlane noted in his treatise 
on The Theory and Practice of Human Rights: 
[tjhere is a tight correlation between the existence of an effective right of 
association and assembly, exercising the associated right of freedom of 
expression and the general recognition and protection of other fun-
damental human rights. This is not surprising, since without effective 
and operative rights of association, assembly and expression .. . there is 
no possibility of taking action to draw attention to and secure redress for 
the invasion of other rights.82 
Moreover, the exercise of these rights is thought, according to 
another writer, to be conducive to social stability in the light of 
the 'escape valve' theory.83 Thus 'citizens who are politically 
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active, who spend their energies on social protest, meeting, parad-
ing, picketing and petitioning are releasing the pressures of 
modern society before the revolutionary elements can reach cri-
tical mass.'84 As this writer concludes: 'It is surely better to have 
the discontented campaigning and litigating, perhaps achieving 
legal and social reform, than to sow the seeds of a terrorist 
underground.'85 Distinguished members of the judiciary have 
also recognized the 'undoubted right of Englishmen to assemble 
together for the purpose of deliberating upon public 
, Of. 
grievances . 
The notion that such a right should find formal legislative 
expression has none the less been disputed by some legal author-
ities. Lord Scarman, for instance, considered it 'unnecessary' to 
enact a 'positive right to demonstrate' since in his opinion the 
right already exists, 'subject only to limits required by the need 
for good order and the passage of traffic',87 and his position was 
supported by the Select Committee charged with the Review of 
the Public Order Act and Related Legislation.88 The extent to 
which the right of association and assembly may be said to exist 
in the above sense has, however, been questioned by Wallington, 
who regards it as tantamount to a mere perception of lawfulness 
in specific circumstances.89 
The need for and the value of codification in the context of 
public processions and meetings have been stated with particular 
conviction by Bevan. He maintains that 'a right of procession 
would afford the protester clear legal protection',90 'provide a 
means of regulating municipal controls',91 and 'bring the liberty 
which underlies protest into sharper relief and hinder the possibil-
ities of its gradual, and sometimes, hidden erosion'.92 Similarly, 
'a statutory right of assembly would force the law to recognize 
assembly as a legitimate usage of many public places'93 and allow 
restrictive local by-laws to be tested judicially.94 American courts 
have acknowledged such advantages,95 and the 'right to expres-
sive usage of public places' is firmly established in American legal 
practice.96 
It is hoped that the code of rights to be incorporated in the 
Basic Law would accord the freedom of association and assembly 
a 'preferred status' within the system of laws. Pending such 
constitutional initiative, however, consideration should be given 
in the light of the above analysis to raising the status of this 
freedom to that of a 'softer'97 legal principle which, although not 
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having the effect of overriding primary legislation, would shift the 
emphasis currently placed on public order objectives to the pro-
tection of civil liberties. 
A shift in a less authoritarian direction is also urged as a 
reaffirmation of democratic values in a period characterized by 
the tentative emergence of a participative culture and a quest for 
more effective communication between the grass roots periphery 
and the bureaucratic centre.98 As Baker contends: 
When conditions and events so strongly offend people's political and 
ethical consciousness that they are moved to take non-violent, disruptive 
steps, the situation has usually become one in which it is more important 
for the community to have its normal routines broken and people's 
everyday activities disrupted in order to awake the government and the 
community to the deep dissatisfaction, than it is for the community to 
avoid the inconveniences of the disruption.99 
Baker's view seems to apply with even greater force to contem-
porary Hong Kong society, the relative stability and homogeneous 
nature of which militate against large-scale social disruption. 
Closely related to the demand for a shift in emphasis from 
authoritarian to libertarian values, and contingent upon a greater 
recognition of the importance of the freedom of association and 
assembly within the legal system, is a possible reform in the 
allocation of the burden of action between those seeking to 
exercise this right and officials entrusted with the power to reg-
ulate it. Specifically, rather than compelling the former to chal-
lenge restrictions imposed on the freedom of association and 
assembly, the law should require the latter to demonstrate that 
such restrictions are warranted. A reform along these lines 
would, one hopes, also result in the removal of registration, 
licensing, bans, and similar prior-control mechanisms.100 
Abolition of prior controls need not, however, entail the jetti-
soning of other means of regulation. For instance, regulation of 
time, place, and manner of a public gathering would not amount 
to an abridgement of the freedom of association and assembly 
provided it did not prevent the exercise of this highly valued 
liberty, particularly where a range of equivalent channels or 
opportunities exists. Indeed, the government ought to assume the 
formal responsibility for ensuring that adequate facilities for 
public expression are available.101 
Needless to say, apart from restrictions pertaining to conduct 
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and manner, the ordinary criminal law could also be relied upon 
in appropriate circumstances, and use could be made of specific 
offences in respect of members of societies or participants in 
public gatherings who are personally involved in violations of the 
law while taking part in the activities of such societies or gather-
ings. However, the ambit of the relevant offences must be nar-
rowly defined and strictly interpreted and adequate defences 
ought to be built into the prohibitions thought necessary.102 
Furthermore, as a general rule the government's view should be 
informed by the 'least restrictive alternative' approach,103 and the 
authorities should be permitted to impose restrictions on the 
freedom of association and assembly only when other alternatives 
have been exhausted or proved ineffective and such a step is 
unavoidable in the face of serious public disorder, personal in-
jury, and significant damage to or destruction of property. 
Protection of the citizen's right to associate and assemble freely 
would none the less remain inadequate as long as the factors 
which justify the circumscription of this right are not meticulously 
defined.104 Moreover, law enforcement officials or judges should, 
in weighing such factors, follow a stringent test along the lines of 
the 'reasonableness'105 or 'clear and present danger' criteria.106 
The adoption of criteria of this type would arguably result in the 
exclusion of prohibitions on the freedom of association and 
assembly which are susceptible to arbitrary and discriminatory 
application and help limit restriction to cases in which evidence is 
available with respect to the seriousness and imminence of a 
social disturbance. 
Equipped with such tools the courts ought to assume a greater 
role in the protection of the freedom of association and assembly 
using their existing authority to interpret the relevant statutes 
while giving more careful consideration to libertarian values than 
can be expected of executive authorities.107 The scope for judicial 
involvement should be extended through provisions allowing 
both the Commissioner of Police and the organizer of an assem-
bly or procession to approach the courts for a determination as to 
whether such gatherings may take place.108 The provision of a 
firm basis for substantive judicial review of executive acts that 
impose restraints on the freedom of association and assembly 
would also reinforce the courts' position as the forum in which 
the individual can obtain redress from the excesses of govern-
ment or government-sanctioned authority. 
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It must be conceded, however, that the likelihood that reforms 
of the kind suggested here will be implemented is not high. The 
preoccupation of both the authorities and the economic establish-
ment with the twin objectives of 'prosperity' and 'stability' mili-
tates against any radical departures from the status quo in this 
particular domain during the transition period before 1997. 
Although there is a general recognition of the need to close 
legislative loopholes in so far as civil liberties are concerned well 
in advance of that critical date, there is perhaps an even greater 
reluctance in official and unofficial quarters to encourage indi-
vidual and group activities which are construed as posing a chal-
lenge to the bureaucracy and detracting from its ability to govern 
efficiently. The freedom of association and assembly, therefore, 
is less likely to loom large on the legislative agenda than some of 
the other civil liberties discussed in this book. 
The problem is compounded by the fact that this freedom does 
not have a 'natural' constituency which is dedicated to promoting 
it as a 'terminal'109 or an 'instrumental'110 value. Thus, for in-
stance, the struggle to uphold the freedom of the press is 
spearheaded by the information industry which has a vested 
interest in liberal press laws and has been reasonably successful111 
in projecting the freedom of the press as something which is 
intrinsically valuable in a civilized society and essential for the 
smooth functioning of a sophisticated service centre (the argu-
ment is that a service economy depends on a free flow of in-
formation). By contrast, there are at present no groups, with the 
possible exception of the legal profession, which perceive a link-
age between the freedom of association and assembly and their 
particularistic interests. For this reason, the government may 
have no incentive to address this issue in earnest. The prospects 
of reform will to all appearances be even poorer after 1997. For, 
while China seems favourably disposed towards the notion of 
capitalist Hong Kong, it will in all probability endeavour to place 
the territory's market economy within a more, rather than less, 
authoritarian political framework. Given the experience of Singa-
pore, South Korea, and Taiwan,112 the Chinese may not be in-
clined to acknowledge the existence of a strong positive correla-
tion between political freedom and economic performance in the 
Asian context; in fact, there is evidence to suggest that they 
believe that the relationship between these variables tends to be 
negative.113 As a corollary, it would be unrealistic to expect them 
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to lend support, before as well as after 1997, to attempts to 
liberalize the laws concerning the freedom of association and 
assembly. 
Nor it is just a matter of the effect of political freedom on 
economic performance. The Chinese leadership apparently sub-
scribes to 'unitary' theories of the public interest (where the 
whole may be conceived as a single set of ends which pertain 
equally to all members of society) rather than "individualistic" 
ones (where the ends of the plurality as a whole are simply the 
aggregate of ends entertained by individuals).114 It may con-
sequently experience genuine difficulties in reconciling itself to the 
idea of a political community in which individuals and groups are 
free to form societies and assemble in pursuit of objectives other 
than those of the social 'organism' of which they are a part. In 
other words, the freedom of association and assembly may suffer 
erosion because they hinge on philosophical assumptions which 
do not dovetail with the conception of the public good prevailing 
in the mainland. 
Low probability should not, of course, be equated with certain-
ty. It would doubtless be inappropriate to leave the reader with 
the impression that the freedom of association and assembly will 
inevitably be curtailed rather than extended. The purpose of the 
note of caution sounded at the end of this chapter is not to 
suppress liberal hopes but to dispel unrealistic expectations. The 
objective of more enlightened laws with respect to the right to 
form societies and assemble is achievable. Yet such laws are 
likely to be introduced, if at all, only following an intense 
dialogue within Hong Kong and between the territory and China. 
The freedom of association and assembly will have to be won. It 
will not be granted willingly by those who exercise control over 
the rights of others. 
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